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REORGANIZING HEALTHCARE 
BANKRUPTCY 
LAURA N. COORDES* 
Abstract: Many healthcare providers are experiencing financial distress, and if 
the predicted wave of healthcare bankruptcies materializes, the entire U.S. econ-
omy could suffer. Unfortunately, healthcare providers are part of a growing group 
of “bankruptcy misfits,” in the sense that bankruptcy does not work for them the 
way it works for other businesses. This is so for two primary reasons. First, the 
Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) is insufficiently specific with respect to healthcare 
debtors. Second, the Code lacks an organizing principle to allow courts to recon-
cile the competing players and interests in healthcare bankruptcy cases. Previous 
attempts to address these issues have not succeeded. Notably, the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 scattered reforms across 
the Code, which made bankruptcy more complicated for healthcare debtors. As a 
result, some have argued that these debtors are better off using bankruptcy alter-
natives, such as state receiverships, to address their debts. This Article asserts 
that despite their bankruptcy misfit status, healthcare providers can realize dis-
tinct benefits from bankruptcy relief. To be effective, however, this relief must 
respond to healthcare providers’ unique needs. Creating separate Code subchap-
ters for healthcare business bankruptcies would allow Congress to clarify many 
aspects of healthcare bankruptcy and enable the development of specific proce-
dures and a distinct organizing principle unique to healthcare provider bankrupt-
cies. Although this proposal contemplates a significant structural change to the 
Code, this Article explains why this change is warranted as part of the Code’s 
necessary evolution. 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S. healthcare is a large and expensive industry. According to estimates 
from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the health share of 
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gross domestic product (GDP) will reach nearly twenty percent by 2025.1 
Health spending totaled almost $3.4 trillion in 20162—about twice as much as 
any other industrialized nation spends on healthcare and almost two-thirds the 
amount spent on retail and food services that year3—and CMS predicts that 
national health expenditure growth will outpace GDP growth at least through 
2026.4 This massive annual spending growth threatens the national economy by 
“crowding out other productive investments such as infrastructure and educa-
tion.”5 
Despite the trillions of dollars that the United States pours into healthcare 
on an annual basis, the industry is on the verge of a serious financial crisis.6 
The healthcare industry regularly grapples with numerous problems, including 
increased competition, legislative uncertainty, changing payment models, 
higher pharmaceutical costs, and rising wages.7 Due in part to these issues, in 
2016 alone, three of the country’s most established healthcare facilities—
Partners HealthCare, the Cleveland Clinic, and MD Anderson—began hemor-
rhaging money.8 
A healthcare provider’s financial distress impacts much more than the 
provider’s bottom line. Healthcare institutions provide critically needed ser-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2016–2025 Projections of National Health 
Expenditures Data Released (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016-
2025-projections-national-health-expenditures-data-released [https://perma.cc/37Q2-C99Y]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Nicholas Rossolillo, What We Learned from the 2016 Retail Sales Numbers, MOTLEY FOOL 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/01/27/what-we-learned-from-the-2016-retail-
sales-numbers.aspx [https://perma.cc/JZ9C-5BFB] (“On the year, total retail and food services spend-
ing increased 3.3% over 2015 to $5.5 trillion.”). 
 4 John Commins, Healthcare Spending at 20% of GDP? That’s an Economy-Wide Problem, 
HEALTHLEADERS (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/finance/healthcare-spending-
20-gdp-thats-economy-wide-problem [https://perma.cc/M8Z4-S8WD]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Ryan Cooper, Opinion, The Slow-Motion Collapse of the American Health-Care System, 
THE WEEK (Nov. 30, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/809992/slowmotion-collapse-american-
healthcare-system [https://perma.cc/YC93-QCLE] (linking problems with suicides and drug overdoses 
to “America’s bloated, Kafkaesque nightmare of a health-care system, which is slow[ly] collapsing 
before our very eyes”). 
 7 Mark G. Douglas, Focus on Health Care Provider Bankruptcies, JONES DAY (Sept.–Oct. 2017), 
http://www.jonesday.com/Focus-on-Health-Care-Provider-Bankruptcies-10-01-2017/ [https://perma.
cc/H5RW-ELGF]; see Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., Ruling Striking Down Obamacare Moves Health De-
bate to Center Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/us/politics/
obamacare-ruling-health-care.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage 
[https://perma.cc/VS2V-MZQE] (describing how a Texas judge’s decision to strike down the Afford-
able Care Act may “imperil[ ] the insurance coverage of millions of Americans”). 
 8 Robert Pearl, Why Major Hospitals Are Losing Money by the Millions, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2017/11/07/hospitals-losing-millions/#4489aebb7b50 [https://
perma.cc/6EPD-7KBA]. 
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vices to the U.S. population.9 As healthcare providers reduce staff, cut spend-
ing, and even shut down entirely in some cases, large swaths of the country are 
left without access to adequate care.10 Inadequate treatment, in turn, leads to 
“thousands of needless deaths each year,” affecting the U.S. population and the 
economy at large.11 
A financially distressed healthcare institution might reasonably consider 
bankruptcy to restructure its debts or sell its assets. Indeed, healthcare bank-
ruptcies more than tripled in 2017,12 and recent trends suggest that healthcare 
providers are continuing to look at bankruptcy as a means to close, consoli-
date, and restructure.13 But the bankruptcy system presents significant conflicts 
with healthcare policy and practice, meaning that the bankruptcy process, in 
practice, very often fails to meet the needs and expectations of healthcare 
debtors, their creditors, regulators, and patients. As a consequence, many 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-401(21) (2017). The statute defines a “health care institu-
tion” as  
[E]very place, institution, building or agency, whether organized for profit or not, that 
provides facilities with medical services, nursing services, behavioral health services, 
health screening services, other health-related services, supervisory care services, per-
sonal care services or directed care services and includes home health agencies . . . out-
door behavioral health care programs and hospice service agencies. 
Id. 
 10 See, e.g., Jack Healy, It’s 4 A.M. The Baby’s Coming. But the Hospital Is 100 Miles Away., 
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/us/hospital-closing-missouri-
pregnant.html [https://perma.cc/Z225-TDPN] (describing problems stemming from lack of obstetric 
services, including delivery of babies outside of the hospital setting and more premature births). 
 11 Lawrence K. Altman, Study Finds Widespread Problem of Inadequate Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 5, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/05/us/study-finds-widespread-problem-of-
inadequate-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/K98G-CG5Z]. 
 12 Ayla Ellison, Healthcare Bankruptcies More Than Triple in 2017, BECKER’S HOSP. CFO REP. 
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/healthcare-bankruptcies-more-than-
triple-in-2017.html [https://perma.cc/AQW6-5ECZ]. 
 13 David A. Samole, Hospital Impact—A Guide to a Healthcare Provider Bankruptcy Case, 
FIERCE HEALTHCARE (July 13, 2017), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/hospitals/hospital-impact-a-
guide-to-a-healthcare-provider-bankruptcy-case [https://perma.cc/2CBV-DZZY]; see Pamela Foohey, 
Counting Healthcare Chapter 11 Filings: Are There More Than Expected?, CREDIT SLIPS (May 23, 
2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/05/counting-healthcare-chapter-11-filings-are-
there-more-than-expected.html [https://perma.cc/GVV5-7PQ9] (noting that, although the “data do not 
show a large increase in healthcare chapter 11 cases in recent years” the data “do show that hospitals, 
physician practices, healthcare systems, and clinics have steadily filed chapter 11 over the last decade, 
perhaps in greater numbers than one may have anticipated”). See generally Harvey R. Miller & Shai 
Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2005) (exploring the role of chapter 11 
bankruptcy in business reorganization, arguing for the need and use of chapter 11 to preserve busi-
nesses, and challenging critics of chapter 11). 
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healthcare institutions struggle to reorganize or even liquidate in this bankrupt-
cy “minefield.”14 
This Article argues that healthcare institutions (also referred to herein as 
“healthcare debtors”) are bankruptcy misfits. The goals and purposes of a 
healthcare institution’s bankruptcy do not mesh well with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s (“Code”) existing statutory framework. Specifically, state and federal 
regulatory policies and practices, designed to protect the public health, conflict 
with the bankruptcy system’s aim of maximizing the value of the business for 
the benefit of all creditors.15 When a healthcare institution files for bankruptcy, 
these public policy issues often come into play in the bankruptcy case. 
Bankruptcy law often conflicts with other laws and policies.16 In the 
healthcare context, however, these conflicts are particularly concerning be-
cause of the healthcare system’s importance to the U.S. economy and popula-
tion.17 Unlike in a traditional business bankruptcy case, a healthcare provider 
bankruptcy involves a distinct set of players, notably regulators and patients, 
whose concerns and interests may conflict with the financial goals of the debt-
or and its creditors.18 As this Article illustrates, these players’ attempts to ad-
dress their collateral concerns interfere with the healthcare debtor’s ability to 
successfully navigate the bankruptcy proceeding.19  
For these reasons, the legal community has long debated whether bank-
ruptcy is an effective or necessary solution for financially distressed healthcare 
institutions.20 These debates echo, to some extent, a larger debate about the 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Jonathan Edwards & Sarah Ernst, Healthcare Providers: Financial Distress Isn’t Going 
Away, BECKER’S HOSP. CFO REP. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/
healthcare-providers-financial-distress-isn-t-going-away.html [https://perma.cc/TXQ2-2HN2] (“Health-
care restructurings are extraordinarily complex because they . . . require practitioners to navigate a 
minefield of healthcare-specific fiduciary, governmental, regulatory, and contractual issues. . . . Bel-
lyflops into healthcare bankruptcies don’t end well.”). 
 15 See Brian P. Stern & Christopher J. Fragomeni, The Triage and Treatment of Healthcare Insti-
tutions in Distress: How to Involve State Regulators in Healthcare Bankruptcies and Receiverships, 
22 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 147, 147–48 (2017) (“Financially distressed healthcare institutions 
pose unique and complex public policy concerns when the goals of an insolvency proceeding conflict 
with a state’s responsibility to regulate the public health through state regulatory agencies.”). 
 16 See Deryck A. Palmer & Michele J. Meises, Collision Course Between Bankruptcy and Health 
Care Laws: Which Will Ultimately Control?, 1999 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1, 17–20 (describ-
ing conflicts between bankruptcy law and labor law, banking statutes, and environmental law). 
 17 See Reed Abelson, Hospitals Stand to Lose Billions Under ‘Medicare for All,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/health/medicare-for-all-hospitals.html [https://
perma.cc/TC3V-M9E2] (noting that “the health care industry . . . makes up 18 percent of the nation’s 
economy and is one of the nation’s largest employers”). 
 18 See Stern & Fragomeni, supra note 15, at 148. 
 19 See infra Part II and notes 79–190. 
 20 See generally Samuel Maizel et al., The Healthcare Industry Post-Affordable Care Act: A 
Bankruptcy Perspective, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249 (2015) (discussing problems with hospital 
bankruptcies); Vinay Chopra, Comment, Too Late for a Fresh Start: Why the Bankruptcy Code 
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appropriate role of bankruptcy as a means to resolve the financial distress of 
other important debtors, such as financial institutions21 and government enti-
ties.22 These debates also reflect bankruptcy’s ability to address certain situa-
tions, such as derivative contract defaults23 and problems with cryptocurren-
cies.24 Using healthcare institutions as a lens, this Article sheds new light on 
these debates by examining the extent to which they reflect underlying con-
cerns with the structure and design of the Bankruptcy Code itself. 
Despite the difficulties inherent in healthcare provider bankruptcy cases, 
this Article concludes that bankruptcy can still serve as a practical and valuable 
remedy for healthcare debtors. In order for healthcare institutions to “fail bet-
ter,” however, the competing powers and priorities of the various players must 
be organized, balanced, and accommodated within the bankruptcy context. 
Unfortunately, neither healthcare policy nor the Bankruptcy Code’s current 
                                                                                                                           
Should Exclude Continuing Care Retirement Communities, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 71 (2010) 
(arguing that the Bankruptcy Code is inappropriate for addressing problems faced by continuing care 
retirement communities); Nancy A. Peterman et al., Bankruptcy Restructuring of Healthcare Entities, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (May 16, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/health
law/Bankruptcy_5_16_17.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ94-LUK9] (suggesting that receiv-
ership is a better option than bankruptcy for healthcare entities). 
 21 See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14: A Proposal, in BANKRUPTCY 
NOT BAILOUT 25 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012) (proposing a new chapter 14 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which would provide financial institutions with Code-based bankruptcy relief); Adam 
J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 97 N.C. L. 
REV. 243 (2019) (arguing against bankruptcy for financial institutions); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy 
for Banks: A Tribute (and Little Plea) to Jay Westbrook, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP PENN L. (2018), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3013&context=faculty_scholarship [https://
perma.cc/RQT4-5F8T] (supporting proposed legislation for bank bankruptcies but noting that bank-
ruptcy for banks “is more controversial among bankruptcy scholars”); Mark Roe, Don’t Bank on 
Bankruptcy for Banks, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/bank-bankruptcy-regulations-by-mark-roe-2017-10?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.
cc/9GXW-95V8] (discussing problems with mega-bank bankruptcies). 
 22 See, e.g., John A.E. Pottow, What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico, 85 
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 689, 689–704 (2016) (analyzing the benefits and limitations of bankruptcy for re-
structuring the debt of Puerto Rico and its municipalities). See generally Laura N. Coordes, Restruc-
turing Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 307 (discussing problems with and reforms to chap-
ter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code for the purpose of restructuring municipal debt). 
 23 See generally Jay L. Westbrook, Sovereign Debt and Exclusions from Insolvency Proceedings, 
in A DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGNS 251 (Christopher G. Paulus ed., 2014) 
(arguing that “[t]he systemic risks created by derivatives . . . cry out for . . . their inclusion in bank-
ruptcy proceedings”). 
 24 See, e.g., Erin Jane Illman & Robert A. Cox, Jr., Bitcoin and Bankruptcy: Why Creditors and 
Bankruptcy Practitioners Need to Understand Cryptocurrencies, BRADLEY (Dec. 14, 2017), https://
www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2017/12/bitcoin-and-bankruptcy-why-creditors-and-bankruptcy-
practitioners-need [https://perma.cc/TU4M-GYWM] (noting that bitcoin is likely to “show up as an 
‘asset’ of the debtor in a bankruptcy case” and that “the value and use of such bitcoin may play an 
important role in the debtor’s bankruptcy case”). 
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structure gives courts (and the affected regulators, debtors, patients, and credi-
tors) this necessary guidance. 
To better align the bankruptcy system and healthcare goals, this Article 
proposes that healthcare institutions’ bankruptcies be addressed through sepa-
rate subchapters of the Bankruptcy Code. As this Article demonstrates, prior 
piecemeal attempts to make the Code more responsive to competing interests 
in the healthcare context have been largely unsuccessful. For this reason, this 
Article posits that bankruptcy law needs a structural adjustment to more fully 
recognize and account for the variety of players in a healthcare institution’s 
bankruptcy and their competing concerns and interests. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I introduces the healthcare indus-
try and describes both its significance to the U.S. economy and its tendency 
toward financial vulnerability.25 Part II discusses the particular problems 
healthcare debtors face in bankruptcy proceedings.26 Although the problems 
are numerous, they can be grouped into two distinct categories. First, the Code 
is insufficiently specific with respect to healthcare issues. And second, the 
Code lacks a way to organize and prioritize the competing interests of the vari-
ous players in a healthcare bankruptcy case. Part III demonstrates how existing 
reforms and alternatives to bankruptcy have fallen short of providing 
healthcare debtors the relief they need.27 Part IV explores whether and how 
healthcare provider bankruptcy cases should fit within the Code’s structure and 
offers two proposals for making bankruptcy more workable for healthcare 
debtors: (i) further, targeted amendments to the Code, and (ii) the addition of 
subchapters within the Code specifically for healthcare business debtors.28 Part 
V concludes by situating the plight of healthcare institutions within the broader 
debate about the design of the Code and how it can or should accommodate the 
needs of a growing and diverse set of debtors, creditors, and interested parties.29 
I. HEALTHCARE’S SIGNIFICANCE AND VULNERABILITY 
The “healthcare industry” or “healthcare sector” is a dynamic field that 
constitutes a significant portion of the U.S. economy. Broadly speaking, the 
industry consists of companies that play three primary roles.30 Companies that 
“provide medical services . . . or otherwise facilitate the provision of 
healthcare to patients,” including hospitals, nursing homes, and skilled nursing 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See infra notes 30–78 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 79–190 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 191–247 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 248–323 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 324–329 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Jim Chappelow, Healthcare Sector, INVESTOPEDIA (July 7, 2019), https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/h/health_care_sector.asp [https://perma.cc/43JM-DXXH]. 
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facilities, comprise a large and visible portion of the healthcare sector.31 Com-
panies that manufacture drugs and medical equipment are the industry’s sec-
ond component, while insurance companies constitute the third component.32 
The various companies that make up the healthcare sector are not treated 
equally in bankruptcy. Notably, the Code prohibits a “domestic insurance com-
pany” from filing for bankruptcy.33 In addition, the Code has some specialized 
provisions for “healthcare businesses,” defined as businesses that, in essence, 
provide for or facilitate the provision of healthcare services.34 For this Article’s 
purposes, a “healthcare institution” or “healthcare debtor” is a business that 
falls within the Code’s current definition of a “healthcare business.”35 Thus, 
this Article is primarily focused on providers, broadly defined, that make up 
the first component of the industry. 
Healthcare spending represents a sizeable chunk of the U.S. economy. In 
2018, U.S. healthcare spending reached $3.6 trillion, up 4.6% from the previ-
ous year.36 This amount represents $11,172 spent on healthcare per person in 
the United States.37 Despite the United States spending the most on healthcare 
globally, it is an inefficient spender because patients frequently attain subopti-
mal health outcomes.38 The federal government is the primary purchaser of 
healthcare in the United States and many hospitals are reliant on Medicare rev-
enue.39 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2018). 
 34 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27A) (2018) (defining the term “health care business” as “any public or 
private entity . . . that is primarily engaged in offering to the general public facilities and services for 
(i) the diagnosis or treatment of injury, deformity, or disease; and (ii) surgical, drug treatment, psychi-
atric, or obstetric care; and . . . includes [any of a number of healthcare institutions and long-term care 
facilities]”). In practice, the Code’s definition has sometimes been read to be limited to healthcare 
businesses that house and feed patients. See, e.g., In re Med. Assocs. of Pinellas, L.L.C., 360 B.R. 
356, 361 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that the examples in the Code’s definition “appear to con-
template something more than a doctor’s office”); In re 7-Hills Radiology, LLC, 350 B.R. 902, 905 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (“[T]he type[s] of health care businesses that were the primary targets of the 
definition were businesses that had some form of direct and ongoing contact with patients to the point 
of providing them shelter and sustenance in addition to medical treatment.”). 
 35 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27A). 
 36 National Health Expenditures 2018 Highlights, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8MF-G7R3]. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Melissa Etehad & Kyle Kim, The U.S. Spends More on Healthcare Than Any Other Country—
But Not with Better Health Outcomes, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-healthcare-comparison-20170715-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/E2PU-FJD3]. 
 39 See Matthew Adam Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J. 223, 253 
(2017) (referencing “one survey finding that the median hospital received nearly forty-four percent of 
its patient revenue from Medicaid alone”); Am. Bankr. Inst., The Healthcare Industry Bankruptcy 
Workouts Forum, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 38 (2000) [hereinafter Workouts Forum]; Program 
Chairs Discuss Future Health Care Distress and Opportunities on Latest ABI Podcast-Ep. 222, AM. 
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The healthcare industry is also a field subject to near-constant change. In 
recent years especially, both for-profit and non-profit healthcare models have 
faced unprecedented challenges. At the same time, the industry’s size and rela-
tive complexity can make necessary innovation difficult for healthcare institu-
tions.40 As a result, new players have threatened to enter the industry to over-
come such inefficiencies, including Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and JPMor-
gan Chase, who announced in January 2018 that they planned to form an inde-
pendent healthcare company for their U.S. employees.41 In addition, previously 
distinct healthcare fields are coming together.42 An example of this is CVS 
Health’s 2017 deal to purchase health insurer Aetna that created an entity that 
both insures and provides healthcare.43 
In part due to this volatility, the healthcare field is highly susceptible to 
financial distress.44 In 2017, hospital profit margins sank to their lowest levels 
since implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
in 2010.45 Rural hospitals routinely fare the worst: at least eighty-five, or 
roughly five percent of the country’s total, have closed since 2010, leaving 
fewer than half of the rural counties in the United States with a hospital that 
                                                                                                                           
BANKR. INST. (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.abi.org/podcasts/program-chairs-discuss-future-health-care-
distress-and-opportunities-ep-222 [https://perma.cc/W4AH-2WY7] [hereinafter ABI Podcast] (noting 
that the government is the biggest customer for many healthcare providers). 
 40 See How We Can Expect the Healthcare Industry to Change in the Future, GEO. WASH. U. SCH. 
BUS., https://healthcaremba.gwu.edu/blog/how-we-can-expect-the-healthcare-industry-to-change-in-the-
future/ [https://perma.cc/D7V2-ZDBU] [hereinafter Healthcare Industry to Change] (“The United 
States has what is arguably the most complex healthcare system in the world. As a result, changes 
within the industry are slow.”). 
 41 Nick Wingfield et al., Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan Team Up to Try to Disrupt 
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/technology/amazon-
berkshire-hathaway-jpmorgan-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/JPE7-BXFA]. 
 42 See id. (“[T]he lines between traditionally distinct areas, such as pharmacies, insurers and pro-
viders, are increasingly blurry.”). 
 43 See Julia Belluz, CrossFit Is Amassing an Army of Doctors Trying to Disrupt Health Care, 
VOX (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/12/13/18095546/crossfit-greg-
glassman-doctors-health-care-prevention [https://perma.cc/LUA4-9U9F] (noting that the founder of 
CrossFit, an exercise program, wants it to be “a substitute for, or an extension of, health care in Amer-
ica”); Wingfield et al., supra note 41 (discussing the possibility that Amazon may enter the pharmacy 
business). 
 44 See RICHARD T. ARROWSMITH ET AL., 2019 MIDWESTERN BANKR. INST., KEEPING THE PA-
TIENT ALIVE: AVOIDING ADMINISTRATIVE INSOLVENCY IN HEALTH CARE CASES 63 (2019) (noting 
that “Medicare Part A [is] projected to be insolvent by 2026”). 
 45 See Fiscal Trends in Hospital Systems: Hospital Margins for 2017 Dive to Lowest Levels Since 
ACA Implementation, MUNINET GUIDE, https://muninetguide.com/infrastructure/healthcare/ [https://
perma.cc/THP9-U5KQ] (noting that the “business” of hospitals has fallen steeply since the ACA’s im-
plementation); see also Matthew Goldstein, $146 Million Default by Nursing Home Chain Leaves U.S. 
on the Hook, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/business/nursing-
homes-mortgage-hud.html?mc_cid=73f2347f3e&mc_eid=fe8c5cf9a6 [https://perma.cc/3ANE-P2LN] 
(“The nursing home industry is increasingly being run by for-profit operators facing dwindling mar-
gins.”). 
428 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:419 
offers obstetric care.46 Private, rural hospitals are increasingly treating patients 
who cannot pay their bills, in part because of the growing popularity of high-
deductible health plans.47 Recently, hospitals have experienced “[c]uts to pub-
lic health-insurance programs, struggles with debt and sharply worsening fi-
nances.”48 The strongest effects are occurring in states that have not expanded 
Medicaid.49 Continuing uncertainty about the ACA and its long-term viability, 
increased competition, a growing need to invest in additional personnel and 
technology, erosion of profitability due to changing payment models, liquidity 
problems, operational changes, higher pharmaceutical costs, and rising wages 
have all been documented as contributing factors to the expected increase in 
the volume of healthcare provider bankruptcies.50 In addition, although bank-
ruptcy filings among all sectors declined by fifty-eight percent after 2010, 
bankruptcy activity in the healthcare sector has increased by 123% during the 
same time period.51 
Often, healthcare institutions that serve the neediest—rural populations 
and the urban poor—are at the highest risk of closing.52 Indeed, “[i]n every 
decade since the 1930s, the U.S. has lost between eleven to twenty percent of 
its urban hospitals.”53 One study found that of the more than twenty hospital 
bankruptcies since 2016, nearly three-quarters operated in rural areas.54 Thus, 
hospitals are struggling—and closing—in the communities that are arguably 
the least equipped to save them. 
As hospitals spend more to care for their patients, changes to Medicare 
reimbursements, changes imposed by the ACA, and cuts to Medicaid due to 
state budget constraints have made it harder for hospitals to maintain financial 
health.55 At the same time, many healthcare provider systems “have significant 
amounts of long-term debt.”56 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Healy, supra note 10. 
 47 John Gregory, ‘Wave’ of Healthcare Bankruptcies Predicted for 2018, HEALTHEXEC (Nov. 28, 
2017), https://www.healthexec.com/topics/finance/wave-healthcare-bankruptcies-predicted-2018 [https://
perma.cc/XK92-Q77H]. 
 48 Healy, supra note 10. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Bruckner, supra note 39, at 231 (“[M]andates to implement expensive new technologies, 
rising drug costs, and declining state and federal support have caused financial strain in the [health-
care] sector.”); Douglas, supra note 7. 
 51 Gregory, supra note 47. 
 52 Bruckner, supra note 39, at 238–39. 
 53 Id. at 238. 
 54 Press Release, Polsinelli, Hospital Bankruptcy Filings Influence Health Care Industry Distress in 
Q3 (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.polsinelli.com/newsevents/news-q3-distress-indices [https://perma.
cc/8DRK-GU29]. 
 55 ARROWSMITH ET AL., supra note 44, at 65 (observing that some sectors have experienced “flat 
to decreasing reimbursement”); Bruckner, supra note 39, at 239–40. 
 56 Bruckner, supra note 39, at 241. 
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Even the country’s largest and most established healthcare facilities have 
not been immune from fiscal difficulties. In 2016, several of these institutions 
lost hundreds of millions of dollars.57 Partners HealthCare (New England’s 
largest hospital network), the Cleveland Clinic, and MD Anderson (the largest 
cancer center in the country) all saw significant declines in their operating in-
come.58 Brigham & Women’s Hospital, the country’s second-largest research 
hospital and a member of Partners HealthCare, laid off almost ten percent of its 
workforce in 2017 due to reduced service reimbursements from insurance pro-
viders and high capital and labor costs.59 Similarly, increased expenses, sala-
ries, and wages led MD Anderson to reduce its workforce by five percent in 
2017, after the institution’s adjusted gross income dropped by seventy-seven 
percent in the prior fiscal year.60 For its part, CMS recently cut $1.6 billion 
from some drug payments and reduced reimbursements for off-campus hospi-
tal outpatient departments.61 These reductions will undoubtedly put further 
strain on healthcare institutions because they must use fewer monetary re-
sources to treat patients who are increasingly “older” and “sicker.”62 
Nearly any industry facing financial distress produces negative externali-
ties. For example, factory closures relating to the financial distress of the auto 
industry can in turn affect the financial health of a city or town reliant on that 
industry for jobs.63 The healthcare industry is no different in this respect.64 The 
negative externalities produced by a healthcare institution’s financial distress, 
however, can have particularly devastating consequences because individuals 
rely on healthcare services to survive.65 For example, a lack of obstetric ser-
                                                                                                                           
 57 Pearl, supra note 8. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.; see Alicia Tuovila, Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 30, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/a/agi.asp [https://perma.cc/KZY9-37XF] (explaining that adjusted 
gross income is calculated by subtracting certain deductions and payments from a taxable entity’s 
gross income). 
 61 Pearl, supra note 8. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Associated Press, Detroit in Bankruptcy: How Did It Happen?, CRAIN’S DETROIT 
BUS. (July 19, 2013), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20130719/NEWS01/130719781/detroit-
in-bankruptcy-how-did-it-happen [https://perma.cc/6EFE-VFKE] (noting that the fall of the auto in-
dustry was “a big factor” in Detroit’s financial distress). 
 64 See Tiffany Kary, Next U.S. Restructuring Epidemic: Sick Health-Care Companies, BLOOM-
BERG (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-27/next-u-s-restructuring-
epidemic-sick-health-care-companies [https://perma.cc/RXR3-E8RC] (“Distress among health-care 
companies can spread to other parts of the economy.”). 
 65 See generally Barbara Feder Ostrov & Lauren Weber, The Collapse of a Hospital Empire—and 
Towns Left in the Wreckage, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://khn.org/news/rural-
hospital-empire-collapse-missouri-town-fallout-jorge-a-perez-empowerhms/ [https://perma.cc/FFN5-
9Z88] (describing the difficulties small communities have faced when local hospitals experience fi-
nancial distress and bankruptcy). 
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vices due to the provider’s financial distress or to hospital closures has been 
linked to a rise in premature births.66 Studies also show that when women with 
inadequate obstetric care go into labor, they are more likely to deliver in emer-
gency rooms or outside of the hospital entirely.67 On a larger scale, a struggling 
healthcare system can negatively impact the country’s economy. Populations 
that lack the means to effectively address illness and injury in turn lack a relia-
ble workforce to generate a strong economy.68 
When a healthcare institution files for bankruptcy, it faces different chal-
lenges from those of other business-debtors due to the complexity of the policy 
issues affecting the institution and the extensive regulatory environment in 
which it operates. “The health care sector is one of the largest and most com-
plex in the U.S. economy,” and it is frequently characterized as the most com-
plex in the world.69 A healthcare company’s business model differs from many 
other companies in part because of healthcare’s payment model where the per-
son receiving care (the patient) is typically not the one paying for it (a private 
or government insurer).70 
Due in part to extensive regulations at both the state and federal levels,71 
the “operations of a health care provider are vastly different from a typical 
business.”72 At the federal level, multiple agencies directly oversee the 
healthcare system, including the Department of Health and Human Services, 
the Centers for Disease Control, CMS, the Veterans Administration, the Food 
and Drug Administration, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quali-
ty.73 In addition to federal regulators, state governments issue licenses to 
healthcare facilities and regulate the quality of care that these facilities pro-
vide.74 In the healthcare industry, steep compliance costs accompany heavy 
regulation; healthcare providers who fail to rigorously follow regulations can 
incur “significant fines and penalties.”75 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Healy, supra note 10. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Kevin Lee-Simion, Healthcare: Its Influence and Importance in the Economy, ASS’N MBAS 
(June 6, 2017), https://community.mbaworld.com/blog/b/weblog/posts/healthcare-its-influence-and-
importance-in-the-economy [https://perma.cc/J68V-CYCS]. 
 69 Healthcare Industry to Change, supra note 40. 
 70 Paul K. Ferdinands & Jeffrey R. Dutson, Issues Arising in Connection with Sales of Health 
Care Companies, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2016, at 30. 
 71 See Palmer & Meises, supra note 16, at 17. 
 72 Id. at 23. 
 73 Healthcare Industry to Change, supra note 40. 
 74 See generally Palmer & Meises, supra note 16. 
 75 Ferdinands & Dutson, supra note 70, at 30; see, e.g., In re Sun Healthcare Group, No. 99-3657, 
2002 WL 2018868, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2002) (noting that a debtor’s healthcare facility failed to 
comply with certain regulations, was terminated from Medicare and Medicaid programs, fined over 
$60,000, and assessed over $133,000 in related overpayments). 
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The regulatory environment is also subject to frequent change and insta-
bility. For example, after the ACA was passed in 2010, more regulatory agen-
cies came into the picture, including the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation and state insurance exchanges.76 An October 2017 report issued by 
the American Hospital Association found that health systems, including hospi-
tals, must comply with 629 regulatory requirements promulgated by four fed-
eral agencies alone.77 The report also found that “the timing and pace of regu-
latory change make compliance challenging” and characterized the environ-
ment surrounding these systems as “regulatory overload.”78 The complex and 
changing healthcare regulatory environment means that the parties with a vested 
interest in the outcome of a healthcare provider bankruptcy case are numerous 
and varied. As each regulator is responsible for particular aspects of a healthcare 
institution’s operation, regulatory goals may conflict with one another and with 
the goals of the bankruptcy process. 
The complexity of the healthcare industry, the impact of the healthcare 
system’s financial distress on the broader community, and the intricate and 
changing regulatory environment all combine to make healthcare provider 
bankruptcies distinctly challenging. As Part II illustrates, the Code has proven 
difficult to use when financially distressed healthcare institutions bring these 
challenges to bankruptcy. 
II. HEALTHCARE DEBTORS AS BANKRUPTCY MISFITS 
This Part outlines the challenges healthcare institutions face when using 
the bankruptcy system.79 Bankruptcy can be a complicated process for 
healthcare institutions, and many healthcare debtors may find that the difficul-
ties of navigating the system outweigh bankruptcy’s benefits. 
Healthcare businesses have several options for bankruptcy. Like all eligi-
ble debtors, they may choose to liquidate their assets under chapter 7 of the 
Code,80 or they may use chapter 11’s provisions to either reorganize their debts 
or engage in a structured sale of the business.81 Healthcare institutions that are 
run by or are part of local governments, such as public hospitals, must use 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See ARROWSMITH ET AL., supra note 44, at 65 (describing an “increased regulatory burden” 
throughout the healthcare sector); Healthcare Industry to Change, supra note 40. 
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HEALTH SYSTEMS, HOSPITALS AND POST-ACUTE CARE PROVIDERS 3 (2017), https://www.aha.org/
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 79 See infra notes 80–190 and accompanying text. 
 80 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2018) (defining eligibility for chapter 7 bankruptcy). 
 81 See id. § 109(d) (defining eligibility for chapter 11 bankruptcy). 
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chapter 9 of the Code to adjust their debts.82 Some healthcare institutions seek-
ing to use bankruptcy may face challenges with respect to their eligibility for a 
particular chapter of the Code.83 
Healthcare institutions that are also nonprofits may face additional diffi-
culties in bankruptcy. For example, when a nonprofit entity seeks to sell or 
transfer assets in bankruptcy, that sale or transfer must comply with non-
bankruptcy law governing nonprofit property transfers.84 Practically speaking, 
this provision means that state attorneys general must approve any sale and 
may (and often do) insist on certain conditions before approving a transfer.85 
With respect to the healthcare industry and others, there is a significant 
body of literature on the challenges faced by nonprofit institutions in bankrupt-
cy.86 For this reason, this Article does not particularly focus on the distinct 
challenges of nonprofit healthcare debtors. It is nonetheless important to note 
that nonprofit healthcare institutions may face difficulties related to their status 
as nonprofits in addition to those inherent in the general healthcare bankruptcy 
context.87 
Healthcare businesses that file for bankruptcy face a range of challenges. 
These difficulties arise in part because healthcare institutions are what this Ar-
ticle terms “bankruptcy misfits.” The Code is insufficiently specific with re-
spect to healthcare debtors, and the Code lacks an organizing principle that 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. § 101(40) (defining “municipality” for purposes of chapter 9 eligibility as a “political 
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adequately addresses the needs and interests of the competing players in a 
healthcare bankruptcy case. As a result, healthcare debtors using the bankrupt-
cy system face considerably more difficulties than the average business debtor. 
Indeed, a 2013 study found that almost two-thirds of hospitals that filed for 
bankruptcy closed, with only one-third completing a reorganization.88 
A. Lack of Specificity 
The Code is insufficiently specific with respect to healthcare debtors. The 
drafters simply did not consider many of the distinct attributes of healthcare 
debtors when they created the Code. As a result, circuit splits, confusion, and 
an overall lack of clarity characterize many critical aspects of healthcare bank-
ruptcy. 
1. Bankruptcy Eligibility 
As discussed in Part I, the healthcare industry is prone to change. For this 
reason, a comprehensive definition of “healthcare” remains elusive under the 
law. Although the Code contains a definition for “health care business,”89 it is 
unclear whether certain newer healthcare entities are eligible to file for bank-
ruptcy.90 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are a prominent example of 
healthcare institutions with an uncertain bankruptcy eligibility status. ACOs, 
which were created under the ACA, are legal entities (typically limited liability 
companies) that coordinate patient care through the formation of networks of 
doctors, hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities.91 Via contract, ACOs are held 
accountable to government and private insurers for the cost and quality of ser-
vices provided to their patients.92 Within an ACO, a particular provider’s reim-
bursement for its services is conditioned on that provider meeting the specific 
financial and quality benchmarks defined in the ACO agreement.93 
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Although the question of ACO bankruptcy eligibility has yet to reach the 
courts, scholars and commentators have explored the question. As a coordina-
tor of patient care, an ACO may not qualify as a “health care business” under 
the Code because the Code’s definition focuses on the provision of services.94 
Yet, ACOs also do not seem to qualify as “domestic insurance companies,” 
which are ineligible for bankruptcy,95 because the structure of the commercial 
entities within the ACO network is more akin to a provider model than to a 
typical insurance company.96 ACOs thus fall somewhere in between healthcare 
providers and insurance companies. 
Even if a court were to find an ACO eligible to file for bankruptcy relief, 
the Code is incompatible with many aspects of the ACO structure. For exam-
ple, if an ACO filed for bankruptcy, each provider or practice group within the 
ACO would still have to make decisions in its own best interest, some of 
which may conflict with the interests of the ACO as a whole.97 Furthermore, 
the status of the practice groups within an ACO is uncertain—namely, would 
these groups be considered “insiders” under the Code?98 If so, the confirmation 
of the ACO debtor’s bankruptcy plan could be in jeopardy, or the practice groups 
themselves might be subject to more litigation as a result of the bankruptcy. 
There are lots of unanswered questions about how an ACO might access 
and fare in bankruptcy. Yet, determining ACO eligibility and compatibility 
with existing bankruptcy law is important because ACOs have played a promi-
nent role in the healthcare industry since passage of the ACA. Without a work-
able solution for addressing their fiscal distress, these critical components of 
the healthcare industry may be forced to simply shut down rather than attempt 
to reorganize or restructure under the bankruptcy system.99 As of 2015, eight 
out of over 600 ACOs around the country had already dissolved due to finan-
cial difficulties.100 
 ACOs are just one example of how the changing nature of the healthcare 
industry presents difficult eligibility questions in bankruptcy. Federal law in 
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general, and bankruptcy law in particular, may soon have to address another 
difficult question, that of the status of medical marijuana. Although marijuana 
remains an illegal drug at the federal level pursuant to the Controlled Sub-
stances Act,101 businesses that provide medical marijuana may be considered 
by states to be “health care businesses.” Thus far, bankruptcy courts have con-
sistently determined that marijuana-linked “health care” businesses are ineligi-
ble for bankruptcy, although it is not clear how closely linked a business must 
be to one distributing marijuana for its bankruptcy petition to be dismissed.102 
If the meaning of “health care” continues to evolve at the state level, it may be 
necessary for bankruptcy law to address the issue of whether the growing 
number of medical marijuana providers should be eligible for bankruptcy. Sim-
ilarly, the CVS/Aetna merger discussed above raises questions about whether 
hybrid “insurer-provider” entities will be eligible for bankruptcy, should they 
need it, because the new company intertwines provisions of healthcare services 
with insurance. As new business structures and organizations enter the 
healthcare field, it will be critical to establish processes for these entities when 
they undergo financial distress. Without a clear understanding of how debt can 
be restructured, creditors may hesitate to lend to these healthcare institutions. A 
healthcare entity with questionable bankruptcy eligibility status may have no 
choice but to shut down if bankruptcy relief is ultimately denied. Thus, the 
Code’s definition of a “health care business” may soon need an update. 
2. Provider Agreements and Quality Assurance Fees 
The majority of healthcare businesses do not face eligibility hurdles when 
seeking to file for bankruptcy. But in many instances, the Code and rules make 
it difficult for healthcare debtors to achieve their desired outcomes in bank-
ruptcy. 
One prominent example of the way in which the design of the Code pre-
sents difficulties for healthcare debtors relates to the Code’s unclear treatment 
of provider agreements. A provider agreement is a contract between a 
healthcare professional and an organization or healthcare plan that governs the 
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relationship between the parties.103 Importantly, any healthcare business re-
ceiving payments from Medicare or Medicaid must have a provider agree-
ment.104 Providers are reimbursed under these agreements, but the reimburse-
ment system used by the federal government often results in the government 
overpaying the provider.105 The provider then owes the government for repay-
ment of any overpayments. 
When a healthcare provider files for bankruptcy, it may try to sell its 
business free and clear of liabilities.106 Provider agreements are valuable assets 
included in these sales because they allow the provider to be repaid from a pri-
vate or government insurer. Unfortunately, the Code does not specify how 
these valuable agreements should be treated in bankruptcy. In the courts, there 
is a split of authority over whether provider agreements constitute executory 
contracts or estate assets.107 If a court deems a provider agreement to be an 
estate asset, the debtor may sell the agreement free and clear of liabilities, in-
cluding overpayments, in bankruptcy.108 
On the other hand, if a court deems a provider agreement to be an execu-
tory contract, one where substantial obligations are outstanding on both sides, 
the Code requires the debtor to “cure” the agreement in the form of repaying 
any liabilities before the debtor can sell it.109 Providers may have received sig-
nificant overpayments from the federal government, making it very expensive 
for the already cash-strapped debtor to cure the agreement in time to sell it.110 
From the debtor’s standpoint, it may be desirable for provider agreements to be 
classified as estate assets in bankruptcy so that they may be sold free and clear 
of any overpayment liability.111 Such treatment can result in significant savings 
for the debtor and may even make the difference between whether the debtor 
can proceed with a sale or be forced out of bankruptcy.112 In contrast, regula-
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tors have argued that these agreements should be considered executory con-
tracts that the debtor must quickly assume (and cure).113 
Only a few decisions have addressed whether provider agreements are 
executory contracts or estate assets.114 Most courts, though not all, have con-
cluded that provider agreements are executory contracts that must be cured 
before they are sold.115 Classifying provider agreements as executory contracts 
is a reasonable interpretation of the Code, which does not provide clear guid-
ance one way or the other. Yet, the practical effect of this interpretation is often 
to deprive the provider of the ability to sell its business in bankruptcy. This is 
because many providers do not have the funds to address their liabilities and 
cure the agreements. For example, in In re Vitalsigns Homecare, the debtor’s 
chapter 7 trustee sought to sell the debtor’s Medicare provider number free and 
clear of encumbrances, to another entity, ABC.116 In response to an objection 
from the government that it should have the right to recoup overpayments from 
future Medicare payments, ABC argued, inter alia, that the amount of the 
overpayment was so high that no one would acquire the provider number with 
the overpayment liability attached.117 Thus, in order for the trustee to maxim-
ize recovery for the benefit of creditors, ABC argued that the trustee should be 
allowed to sell the provider number free and clear of this substantial encum-
brance.118 
Another example of a lack of clarity in the Code with respect to healthcare 
debtors relates to the treatment of quality assurance fees. Some states impose 
quality assurance fees on certain healthcare providers, such as skilled nursing 
facilities.119 These fees are collected by the state and distributed as a way to 
provide additional support and improvements for all similar facilities in the 
state.120 It is not clear whether these fees are excise taxes, and thus entitled to 
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special priority in bankruptcy.121 Like the aforementioned issues, the Code 
does not provide specific guidance and healthcare debtors are uncertain as to 
the priority these fees should receive with respect to other payments to credi-
tors. 
Uncertainty over how a court will classify provider agreements and quali-
ty assurance fees in bankruptcy makes the healthcare bankruptcy process un-
predictable. The lack of clear guidance on these classification issues makes it 
difficult to place an accurate value on the debtor’s bankruptcy assets, raises 
questions about the relative priorities of the debtor’s various creditors, and 
leaves provider agreement counterparties uncertain of the treatment they will 
receive in the bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy is designed to offer an expedited forum for resolving dis-
putes, and production of predictable outcomes for creditors is often touted as 
one of bankruptcy’s key attributes.122 Given these characteristics, the uncer-
tainty surrounding provider agreements and quality assurance fees diminishes 
the value of the bankruptcy process for debtors and creditors alike. Further-
more, a court’s resolution of these issues can effectively determine whether 
bankruptcy will be a viable option for a particular healthcare debtor, making 
certainty in this area highly desirable in order for a prospective debtor to accu-
rately engage in pre-bankruptcy planning. 
3. Jurisdiction 
One of the most significant problems in a healthcare provider bankruptcy 
case is the uncertainty surrounding what issues the bankruptcy court has the 
authority to address. In particular, there is a question of whether bankruptcy 
courts have jurisdiction to resolve Medicare and Medicaid disputes.123 
Whether a federal or state agency can terminate a healthcare debtor’s 
Medicare or Medicaid provider agreement in bankruptcy is currently not clear. 
Outside of bankruptcy, “federal and state officials may terminate a provider 
agreement if they determine that the provider is not complying with its terms 
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or other legal requirements.”124 If a provider wishes to dispute the termination, 
the Social Security Act limits that provider’s ability to pursue such claims in 
federal court.125 Specifically, before proceeding in federal court, the provider 
must exhaust its administrative remedies with the agency in question.126 The 
backlog of administrative cases is significant, meaning that the status of a pro-
vider’s agreement could be in question for years.127 Given the importance and 
value of a provider agreement, keeping the status of that agreement in limbo 
for years is an untenable position in the context of a bankruptcy, where prompt 
resolution of issues is essential. 
Although bankruptcy courts are federal courts, they were excluded from 
the Social Security Act’s definition of a “federal court” for purposes of the ex-
haustion requirement.128 It is unclear, however, whether this exclusion was in-
tentional or a mere oversight. In bankruptcy, some healthcare providers have 
tried to argue that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear and resolve 
their dispute with the agency even if the provider has not exhausted its admin-
istrative remedies.129 Most circuits have said that bankruptcy courts lack juris-
diction unless the provider has exhausted administrative remedies.130 The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has held that exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies is not necessary for a bankruptcy court to have jurisdiction to 
resolve the dispute.131 But in many circuits, exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies is necessary, making bankruptcy a weaker tool for a healthcare debtor to 
address its debts comprehensively.132 
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4. The Automatic Stay and Recoupment 
Government attempts to recoup or set off Medicare and Medicaid reim-
bursement overpayments add yet another complication to the healthcare bank-
ruptcy process. Medicare and Medicaid use a periodic interim payment system, 
whereby the agency reimburses providers before making a final determination 
as to the reimbursed amount.133 If the government agency overpays, the pro-
vider must return any overpayment.134 If a provider files for bankruptcy before 
returning overpayments, courts are divided over whether bankruptcy’s auto-
matic stay prohibits the federal or state government from attempting to recover 
the overpayments.135 The issue turns on whether the attempt at recovery is a 
“setoff” or “recoupment.” 
Most courts have held that a provider’s participation in Medicare is a 
“single, integrated, and ongoing transaction,” meaning that any government 
recovery of overpayments is classified as a recoupment, rather than a setoff of 
amounts from different transactions.136 The distinction between setoff and re-
coupment matters because post-bankruptcy setoffs of mutual pre-bankruptcy 
claims arising from separate transactions are subject to the automatic stay.137 In 
contrast, recoupment actions, arising from a single transaction, are said not to 
span pre- and post-petition claims and are thus not subject to the automatic 
stay.138 Thus, if a court holds that the government’s attempt at recovery is a 
recoupment, the government can effectively “jump the line” and get paid first, 
ahead of other creditors.139  
The recoupment doctrine is not uniformly applied in healthcare provider 
bankruptcy cases.140 In University Medical Center v. Sullivan, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that efforts to recover prepetition overpayments 
from post-petition Medicare payments constituted a setoff and subjected these 
efforts to the automatic stay.141 In contrast, the First, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. 
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Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that under the Medicare statute, a single 
transaction can include a series of many occurrences, as long as these occur-
rences are linked by a logical relationship.142 These circuits have therefore 
concluded that efforts to recover overpayments are in fact properly classified 
as recoupments. 
Once again, conflicting precedent over the treatment of money in the 
healthcare provider bankruptcy context makes bankruptcy less predictable and 
arguably less useful for distressed healthcare businesses. When a court charac-
terizes government recovery of overpayments as a recoupment, the bankruptcy 
norm of equality of distribution among creditors is undermined.143 Further-
more, in the majority of circuits where overpayment collection efforts have 
been classified as recoupments, such efforts, when allowed by the bankruptcy 
courts, can significantly disrupt the revenue cycles of healthcare institutions 
and could make the difference between a successful bankruptcy outcome and 
the closure of the facility.144 Inconsistency with respect to classification of 
overpayment recovery thus impacts both the relative priorities of a healthcare 
debtor’s creditors and the valuation of such debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 
 This Subsection has shown that many critical issues in a healthcare bank-
ruptcy case remain unresolved from a legislative standpoint and up for debate 
in the courts. These issues cut to the heart of bankruptcy law: they impact 
bankruptcy’s priority scheme, interfere with the valuation of the debtor’s bank-
ruptcy estate, and create uncertainty with respect to who can appear as a debtor 
and what issues can be raised in bankruptcy court. 
B. Competing Players and Interests 
Unfortunately, lack of clarity is not the only problem characterizing 
healthcare provider bankruptcy cases. There are many competing players and 
interests in a healthcare provider bankruptcy and bankruptcy law currently 
lacks a sufficient organizing principle to reconcile them. This Subsection de-
scribes the difficulties with these conflicting interests in detail. 
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1. Regulators 
The presence and influence of regulators create significant challenges in 
the bankruptcy of a healthcare business. Both state and federal regulators play 
critical roles in the healthcare industry, and their involvement does not cease 
when a healthcare provider files for bankruptcy. 
In the healthcare context, regulators’ goals frequently conflict with the 
purposes of bankruptcy law.145 A regulator’s priority is to ensure provision of 
adequate healthcare, while bankruptcy law aims to maximize the debtor’s val-
ue for the benefit of creditors.146 Observing this conflict, the district court in In 
re United Healthcare System remarked:  
Unlike the sale of corporations in the private sector, [healthcare pro-
vider bankruptcy] involves the rights and obligations of the State to 
govern public health. The most valuable asset of the debtor, i.e., its 
goodwill, is inextricably intertwined with the requisite . . . licenses 
which can only be granted by [regulators].”147  
Thus, regulatory actions are a necessary consideration for any bankruptcy 
court presiding over a healthcare provider’s bankruptcy case. 
By virtue of their authority, regulators can exercise substantial power in a 
bankruptcy case.148 For example, state regulators can revoke a healthcare pro-
vider’s license to operate, thus forcing the debtor to cease its operations imme-
diately.149 Because approval from regulators is necessary in the sale of a 
healthcare business, regulators who impose conditions on a sale may increase 
the administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate, making it more difficult 
for the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy.150 In the case of nonprofits, the sale 
of the business is subject to “extensive” regulatory approvals.151 Compliance 
with regulatory requirements and conditions can delay or stall a sale and this 
delay may increase costs, either for the debtor itself or for a purchaser funding 
the debtor’s operations prior to closing.152 Furthermore, because government 
money is critical to healthcare providers, both federal and state regulators can 
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influence the amount of funds the debtor has available to pay other creditors.153 
Regulators thus may directly affect the bankruptcy estate’s value, as well as the 
amount and timing of funds distributed to the debtor’s creditors.154 Finally, 
because of the significant role it plays in the healthcare industry, the govern-
ment is often both a regulator and a creditor in a healthcare provider bankrupt-
cy case. This raises important questions about whether and when the govern-
ment should receive different treatment from other creditors.155 
The regulatory environment necessarily and significantly shapes a 
healthcare provider’s bankruptcy case. Regulators, particularly at the state lev-
el, often get involved in a sale of the healthcare business in order to determine 
how the sale will affect the community’s public health and how provision of 
healthcare will align with regional needs.156 This state oversight process neces-
sarily interferes with the bankruptcy process and can alter the rights of credi-
tors and other stakeholders.157 In other cases, regulators may push to keep a 
struggling healthcare provider open in the interests of the community, while 
the provider believes it is in its best financial interests to shut down.158 
Sometimes, the involvement of regulators can lead to power struggles, as 
the bankruptcy court must determine whether it has the ability to approve a 
sale or other plan of debt restructuring even in the absence of regulatory ap-
proval.159 For example, the bankruptcy court in In re HHH Choices Health 
Plan was asked to approve the sale of the assets of a continuing care retirement 
community and had to determine whether state court procedures must be fol-
lowed for the approval of the sale that the bankruptcy court had already found 
to be proper.160 The bankruptcy court concluded that although other approvals 
might be necessary for the sale to go through, the court had the ultimate power 
to determine the disposition of the debtor’s estate assets.161 
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In contrast, in In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, CMS sought to terminate the 
debtor’s Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements even though the bank-
ruptcy court had entered a plan confirmation order providing that the agree-
ments could be assumed.162 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to review or to enjoin 
CMS’s decision.163 
Because they may revoke licenses, hamper operations, and even shut 
down a healthcare business entirely,164 regulators are often the key to the suc-
cess or failure of a healthcare provider’s bankruptcy case. It is therefore critical 
for courts to understand how to determine whether healthcare regulations or 
bankruptcy law should take precedence in any given instance.165 Although at 
least one court has cautioned that bankruptcy courts “may not impede the State 
in its obligations to protect the health and safety of its citizenry,”166 questions 
about the extent and scope of regulatory authority with respect to the bank-
ruptcy court abound. 
Some commentators have argued that regulators must play significant 
roles in bankruptcy.167 There is evidence that coordination with state regulatory 
agencies in particular can assist with a successful bankruptcy.168 By contrast, 
failure to involve regulators in a bankruptcy can detrimentally delay a case.169 
If a healthcare debtor seeks to close or transfer its operations, it must coordi-
nate with all necessary regulatory bodies to ensure, for example, that any li-
censes are properly transferred. 
But more regulator participation will not answer the question of how 
much authority a bankruptcy court has to override a given regulator’s condi-
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tions.170 It seems clear that the bankruptcy process was not designed merely to 
yield to regulators’ concerns; however, regulators wield extensive power over 
healthcare debtors, making them a critical component of a case’s success or 
failure.171 Given the often conflicting purposes of bankruptcy and healthcare 
regulation, power struggles between the court and regulators can significantly 
impact a healthcare debtor’s bankruptcy case.172 
2. Patients 
Another complicating factor in healthcare bankruptcies is the presence of 
individuals whose lives and safety may depend on the outcome of the bank-
ruptcy case: patients. As discussed further below, certain Code amendments 
attempt to ensure that the needs and safety of patients are considered in a 
healthcare provider’s bankruptcy case.173 Nonetheless, there is a significant 
risk that the bankruptcy process will disrupt patients’ lives and well-being, and 
it is not clear how much of a say, if any, patients should have in a bankruptcy 
case. Furthermore, statutes and regulations relating to patients, such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), discussed im-
mediately below, can interfere with the bankruptcy process. 
Bankruptcy requires transparency and due process for all parties. Yet, 
when transparency involves patient information, the Code can conflict with the 
provisions of HIPAA. During a bankruptcy, parties commonly share docu-
ments in order to collect information, process creditors’ claims, and tally votes 
on a plan of action.174 In a healthcare provider bankruptcy, these documents 
may reveal confidential patient data and personal details.175 If a patient has not 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See David Deaton et al., Distressed Healthcare: Significant Considerations for Buyers, 
Sellers, and Lenders Arising from the Intersection of Healthcare and Bankruptcy Laws, 3 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCI. L. 1, 40 (2010) (noting that case law does not directly address whether a distressed 
healthcare provider can transfer its state licenses and certificates of need to an acquirer without first 
seeking approval from the applicable state authority in the bankruptcy context and concluding that “a 
bankruptcy court may have authority under bankruptcy law to effectuate a transfer . . . without the 
consent of the appropriate state authority”) (emphasis added). 
 171 See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization After Jevic, 93 
WASH. L. REV. 631, 706 (2018) (noting that the chapter 11 process “exists in part to give all stake-
holders a say in what becomes of the debtor’s assets” and that this purpose is not met if chapter 11 
serves only the goals of senior creditors). 
 172 See MAUREEN D. CARMAN & RICHARD WARNE, ENERGY & MINERAL LAW INST., SMCRA 
ENFORCEMENT IN BANKRUPTCY: REGULATORY POWERS REVISITED 208–09 (2005) (noting that §§ 959 
and 362 of the Bankruptcy Code require debtors to comply with state laws while in bankruptcy and allow 
regulators to compel adherence to these laws, but that § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code also recognizes that 
in certain cases, the debtor may be entitled to relief from these laws). 
 173 See infra notes 191–225 and accompanying text. 
 174 Marcus Helt & Travis K. Vandell, Healthy Outcomes from HIPAA and Corporate Bankruptcy, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2016, at 24. 
 175 Id. 
446 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:419 
authorized the release of this information, such document sharing constitutes a 
HIPAA violation.176 Although healthcare debtors can take steps to establish 
procedures to ensure against the inadvertent disclosure of HIPAA-protected 
information, doing so takes time and may possibly impede efforts to reconcile 
creditors’ claims.177 In addition, because a healthcare business’s success in 
bankruptcy often depends on whether the debtor can move quickly through the 
bankruptcy process, any delay in the process itself can harm a debtor’s chances 
of exiting bankruptcy on firmer footing.178  
Even if a healthcare debtor can address HIPAA concerns, some healthcare 
institutions provide critical services to their communities. If these healthcare 
providers cease operations or default on their debts such that their ongoing op-
eration is threatened, crises can result on a larger scale.179 The fact that a 
healthcare provider’s bankruptcy can trigger a public welfare crisis may color 
the way the bankruptcy judge oversees and decides the case.180 For example, 
the bankruptcy court in In re Bayou Shores held that the debtor, a skilled nurs-
ing facility uniquely suited to providing care to patients with acute dementia 
and similar problems, could assume a Medicare provider agreement and thus 
could continue to operate post-bankruptcy.181 The state regulatory agency had 
previously announced that it would not renew the debtor’s nursing license be-
cause the debtor had failed to comply with the terms of its Medicare provider 
agreement.182 The bankruptcy judge, in an apparent effort to prevent the facili-
ty from closing anyway, held that there was at least a colorable argument that 
the facility would get its license renewed because it could assume the provider 
agreement.183 Observers noted that the judge’s decision may in part have been 
driven by his desire not to be responsible for shutting the facility down.184 
Another recent case illustrates the challenges of balancing the needs of 
the debtor, its patients, and regulators. When Hahnemann University Hospital 
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filed for bankruptcy seeking to close down, state authorities protested due to 
concern that the “low-income and vulnerable” patients the hospital primarily 
serves would be unable to obtain adequate medical care.185 State health author-
ities claimed that they, rather than the bankruptcy court, should oversee the 
hospital’s closure.186 For its part, the bankruptcy court urged Hahnemann and 
CMS authorities to negotiate before closing down.187 The competing needs and 
desires of patients, regulators, and the debtor have brought substantial turbu-
lence to the bankruptcy case.188 For example, out of concern that local gov-
ernment involvement would slow the bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge 
denied a request from local officials to be included as a consultation party dur-
ing negotiations with potential bidders for the hospital’s children’s unit, saying 
instead that city officials should be kept informed by the hospital’s owners and 
could be present at the auction for the unit.189 
 Healthcare providers face significant uncertainty when filing a bankrupt-
cy case. The Code does not address many issues that are of specific concern to 
healthcare providers and that may dictate the success or failure of the provid-
er’s bankruptcy case. Further, the courts are divided over many other issues 
that are critical to the progression of these cases. 
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In addition, there are distinct competing interests in a healthcare bank-
ruptcy that are simply not present in other business bankruptcies.190 In particu-
lar, it is important for courts to know how to account for and reconcile the 
goals and needs of patients and regulators relative to the goals of bankruptcy 
law more generally. Lack of guidance regarding how to balance the concerns 
of the debtor, its creditors, and its regulators may result in power struggles be-
tween regulators and the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy system, by and 
large, has failed to manage these competing interests in a predictable way, cre-
ating uncertainty for the courts as to how to maximize the debtor’s value with-
out disrupting patient care. As discussed further below, attempts to address 
some of the challenges of a healthcare provider bankruptcy case have raised 
new concerns involving bankruptcy’s ability to provide a predictable process 
for healthcare debtors. 
III. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES 
Scholars and policymakers have not been ignorant of the difficulties 
healthcare businesses face in bankruptcy and have responded to these chal-
lenges in two primary ways. First, Congress sought to better harmonize bank-
ruptcy law with healthcare debtors’ needs when it enacted the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Unfortu-
nately, these piecemeal reforms have had precisely the opposite result, intro-
ducing further complications to healthcare bankruptcies. Consequently, some 
commentators have argued for a second option: steering healthcare businesses 
away from bankruptcy entirely and toward alternative solutions, namely state 
receiverships. State receiverships, however, while appropriate in some instanc-
es, are not an adequate substitute for bankruptcy relief in all situations. 
A. BAPCPA 
BAPCPA introduced an extensive set of revisions to the Code with the aim 
of enacting significant reforms across many areas of bankruptcy law and prac-
tice. With respect to the bankruptcy cases of healthcare providers, however, 
BAPCPA’s changes have often raised more issues than they have resolved.191 
In an attempt to recognize that healthcare debtors sometimes require spe-
cial treatment in bankruptcy, BAPCPA added specific definitions to the Code 
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pertaining to healthcare businesses. Notably, BAPCPA introduced the defined 
term “health care business” to the Code. A “health care business” is a public or 
private entity that is primarily engaged in offering to the general public facili-
ties and services for (i) the diagnosis or treatment of injury, deformity, or dis-
ease and (ii) surgical, drug treatment, psychiatric, or obstetric care.192 
With BAPCPA, Congress also sought to recognize the importance of pro-
tecting patients’ lives and information in a healthcare provider bankruptcy 
case. BAPCPA added definitions for a “patient”193 and “patient records”194 to 
the Code. Congress also sought to have the Code acknowledge the strict confi-
dentiality and disclosure requirements that patient records are subject to at both 
the federal and state levels.195 In this respect, BAPCPA amended the Code to 
provide detailed requirements for the disposal of patient records in the event 
that the debtor or bankruptcy trustee cannot afford to pay for the adequate, se-
cure storage of these records.196 
BAPCPA also added provisions to the Code relating to the transfer of pa-
tients in the event that a healthcare facility debtor is closing down.197 Specifi-
cally, a debtor or bankruptcy trustee must use all “reasonable and best efforts” 
to transfer patients to a healthcare business that (i) is in the vicinity of the 
healthcare business that is closing, (ii) provides substantially similar services, 
and (iii) maintains a reasonable quality of care.198 Although this definition was 
intended to provide guidance on the transfer of patients when necessary, in 
practice it raises more questions than it answers. For example, if the debtor’s 
estate is administratively insolvent, meaning that the debtor does not even have 
the money to exit bankruptcy, how is the court to determine what “reasonable 
and best efforts” are?199 Similarly, the “reasonable quality of care” standard 
does not provide a specific benchmark by which to measure the care offered at 
the transferee facility.200 Along with the provisions on the treatment of patient 
records, these provisions may impose substantial costs on healthcare business-
es that are already struggling to stay afloat.201 
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More broadly, the chances of a healthcare debtor becoming administra-
tively insolvent—and therefore unable to emerge from bankruptcy—have risen 
with BAPCPA’s passage. BAPCPA now requires administrative expense priori-
ty for the actual and necessary costs and expenses that the debtor, bankruptcy 
trustee, and/or regulators incur when closing a healthcare business.202 Because 
these costs, along with the costs of preserving or destroying patient records and 
transferring patients, are now deemed non-dischargeable and must be paid in 
order for the debtor to exit bankruptcy, healthcare debtors may now have a 
harder time exiting bankruptcy and paying their creditors anything at all. Fur-
thermore, because these potentially significant administrative expense claims 
trump the claims of other creditors, lenders may provide less favorable terms 
to healthcare debtors or may discourage these debtors from using the bank-
ruptcy system in the event of a default.203 
BAPCPA further sought to protect the rights and interests of patients by 
providing for the appointment of a disinterested patient care ombudsman 
(PCO).204 In general, the court must appoint a PCO within thirty days of the 
commencement of any healthcare provider bankruptcy case.205 The PCO is 
responsible for monitoring patient care quality and representing the interests of 
the healthcare business’s patients more generally.206 The PCO is paid as a “pro-
fessional person” by the debtor-in-possession or trustee in bankruptcy.207 
BAPCPA provides no standards or guidance for how the PCO is to meas-
ure the quality of patient care. Instead, the amendments require the PCO to 
monitor the quality of patient care “to the extent necessary under the circum-
stances.”208 The PCO must make a report to the court every sixty days, either 
at a hearing or in writing, about patient care quality.209 Because PCOs are 
compensated with funds from the bankruptcy estate, they add another cost to 
the bankruptcy cases of healthcare debtors.210 
The Code imbues the PCO with no formal powers and no direct ability to 
influence a plan of liquidation or reorganization. Thus, a PCO’s effectiveness 
depends greatly on the individual appointed and his or her ability to cooperate 
with the other parties in the case. The Code does not define the scope of the 
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PCO’s work,211 nor does it provide any guidance as to the scope or content of 
the PCO’s court reports.212 Moreover, the Code does not give the PCO any par-
ticular power to obtain patient information,213 and it does not contemplate any 
formal role for the PCO in the ultimate restructuring or sale, despite the fact 
that the PCO may have a valuable perspective about continuing patient care.214 
Although many PCOs have learned to work around these issues in practice, a 
significant number of details relating to the PCO’s responsibilities are unre-
solved, leaving PCOs and the parties they work with uncertain as to whether 
and how the PCO should play a role in the case.215 Carving out a defined role 
for the PCO can be particularly difficult because PCOs are concerned with pa-
tients “whose interests do not necessarily coincide with the economic interests 
of [regulators, creditors, the debtor, and] other case participants.”216 Thus, un-
like in a typical bankruptcy, where the focus is primarily on the business’s fi-
nancial aspects, in a healthcare provider’s bankruptcy case, the PCO require-
ment mandates at least a partial focus on delivery of healthcare to patients.217 
Finally, BAPCPA created a new exception to the automatic stay, which al-
lows the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to exclude a debtor 
from participation in Medicare or any other federal healthcare program.218 
Practically speaking, this amendment allows HHS to threaten providers with 
the loss of all future Medicare payments and makes it more difficult for pro-
viders to avoid Medicare-related obligations and penalties by declaring bank-
ruptcy.219 Indeed, HHS may use its powers to compel the debtor to turn over 
Medicare overpayments much earlier in a case.220 The debtor may thus find 
itself in a financial crunch early on in a bankruptcy case.221 
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Although it seems clear that one of the driving factors behind BAPCPA’s 
healthcare provisions was to elevate and highlight patient interests in a bank-
ruptcy case, the focus and expertise of many bankruptcy courts continues to be 
on the economic impact of these provisions on the bankruptcy estate.222 Thus, 
the clash among the policy goal of protecting patients’ lives and interests, the 
regulatory goal of providing adequate healthcare to entire communities, and 
the bankruptcy goal of maximizing estate value, thrives in the post-BAPCPA 
era. One observer concluded that “the bankruptcy option has become more 
complicated and more costly” as a result of BAPCPA.223 Through its various 
provisions scattered across the Code, BAPCPA has increased costs for debtors 
and introduced a new player, the PCO, who must figure out how to reconcile 
its constituents’ interests with the already competing interests of the debtor, its 
creditors, and its regulators.224 Far from providing new mechanisms to manage 
competing interests in a healthcare bankruptcy, BAPCPA merely amplified 
certain patient-related interests without providing guidance as to how these 
interests are to be balanced with other important interests in the case.225 
B. Bankruptcy Alternatives 
Although BAPCPA made efforts to recognize and address healthcare 
debtors’ distinct difficulties, these debtors have continued to struggle when 
using the bankruptcy system. Scholars have therefore questioned whether 
bankruptcy is an effective remedy for healthcare debtors. Some have argued 
that the needs of healthcare and bankruptcy law can be balanced by the courts, 
and that with careful pre-bankruptcy planning on the part of healthcare provid-
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ers, bankruptcy can be used to achieve their desired outcomes.226 Yet, it is of-
ten difficult to determine an optimal balance between healthcare and bankrupt-
cy law, and many businesses, healthcare providers included, fail to plan for 
bankruptcy in any meaningful sense. This has led a growing group to advocate 
for the use of bankruptcy alternatives, particularly state receiverships, in lieu of 
bankruptcy as a way for healthcare providers to address financial distress. 
A receivership is a creditor’s remedy available under state law.227 When a 
lender seeks to put an entity into a receivership, a state court appoints a receiv-
er over the business.228 The receiver’s primary task is to liquidate the company, 
with the subsequent sale approved by the state court.229 After the sale, the re-
ceiver distributes the funds generated in accordance with state law priorities 
before closing the case.230 
Champions of state receiverships argue that they are a better option than 
bankruptcy for a number of reasons.231 Receiverships are often faster and more 
cost-effective than bankruptcy because there is no need to service pre-
receivership debts and all of the debtor’s assets are preserved for creditors’ 
benefit.232 A receivership can also protect patients because it allows for an or-
derly transition to a new operation or a sale without displacing residents or 
jeopardizing operating licenses.233 In the healthcare context in particular, a re-
ceivership can be a way for a healthcare facility to remain open while its assets 
are sold off.234 
Despite these attributes, receiverships are not a substitute for bankruptcy 
relief.235 Because receiverships are run under state law, states are typically re-
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sponsible for financing the entity while it is in receivership.236 Many states 
would not be able to finance the receiverships of all or even a few of the 
healthcare providers within their borders.237 In addition, state receivership laws 
vary widely.238 Thus, receiverships may be difficult to develop on a larger 
scale as would be necessary in the event of a widespread financial crisis. 
Receiverships are limited in other ways, too. Because receiverships are 
initiated by creditors, rather than debtors, they do not provide the same protec-
tions for debtors that bankruptcy does.239 If a debtor has a significant number 
of creditors all vying for the same assets, a receivership may not sort out these 
creditors in the same value-maximizing way that bankruptcy would because 
receiverships, unlike bankruptcy, do not require all creditors to participate in 
the same proceeding.240 Bankruptcy also provides much-needed breathing 
space to allow the debtor time to assess whether it is better off proceeding as a 
going concern or liquidating. In the healthcare context, intervention by regula-
tors or creditors through a receivership may heighten the risk of premature, 
inefficient liquidation.241 
Unlike in a bankruptcy case, receiverships do not discharge debts, and re-
ceivers, unlike bankruptcy trustees or debtors-in-possession, cannot recover 
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preferences.242 In addition, the goal of a receivership is to protect the interests 
of the particular creditor seeking the receivership, and there is little reason to 
think that a receivership will better manage competing interests compared to a 
bankruptcy, where more stakeholders are present due to the collective nature of 
the bankruptcy process.243 Instead, bankruptcy’s court-driven process, which 
requires dissenting creditors to fall in line, may be more beneficial when credi-
tors are competing for the debtor’s assets. Thus, receiverships are an alterna-
tive to, but not a complete replacement for, bankruptcy’s debtor protections 
and creditor-management tools. 
Of course, receiverships are not the only alternatives to bankruptcy for a 
struggling healthcare business. But some other out-of-bankruptcy workouts, 
such as mergers, have recently come under scrutiny for the effect they have on 
the price of medical care.244 Without a consistent bankruptcy option, “[f]lailing 
hospitals often have little choice but to be acquired or go out of business.”245 
The merger of healthcare businesses has been found to increase costs for pa-
tients.246 Thus, while alternatives to bankruptcy may be useful to—or even 
preferable for—healthcare entities under certain circumstances, they are not a 
complete replacement for bankruptcy, and they come with their own risks. 
There will therefore still be occasions when a healthcare provider should seek 
bankruptcy relief. Finally, receiverships and other alternatives to bankruptcy 
suffer from the same problems identified in Part II: they are general remedies, 
not specifically designed for healthcare debtors, and they lack an organizing 
principle for reconciling competing interests. 
The bankruptcy process continues to pose challenges for healthcare pro-
viders. BAPCPA’s reforms to the Code left many issues unaddressed and creat-
ed new problems even as the drafters attempted to provide additional recogni-
tion to healthcare debtors’ unique needs. Alternatives to bankruptcy may be 
viable in some cases, but they are not substitutes for the bankruptcy process’s 
unique attributes. The difficulties healthcare debtors face in bankruptcy have 
led some to speculate that “a healthcare business can’t file for bankruptcy and 
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succeed, . . . they always fail.”247 Indeed, in this highly regulated and socially 
sensitive environment, the ordinary bankruptcy process seems substantially 
insufficient. 
IV. REORGANIZING HEALTHCARE BANKRUPTCY 
The previous Parts have shown that bankruptcy law’s treatment of 
healthcare debtors is incomplete and inconsistent because the Code does not 
adequately address these debtors’ unique circumstances. While bankruptcy 
courts regularly interpret and apply bankruptcy law to healthcare debtors, 
many of these interpretations have been inconsistent or have weakened bank-
ruptcy as a tool for healthcare providers. The precarious financial state of 
many healthcare providers, along with the importance of these providers to 
individuals’ well-being, makes it critical to ask: what role, if any, should bank-
ruptcy law play for distressed healthcare businesses in the future? To answer 
this question, this Part first examines other instances where a bankruptcy “fit” 
has been called into question and then considers two possible avenues for im-
proving the bankruptcy process for healthcare debtors.248 
A. When Is Bankruptcy Appropriate? 
Healthcare is not the only industry where observers have questioned the 
suitability of a bankruptcy resolution. This Subsection describes two other indus-
tries—banks and railroads—where scholars have debated the appropriateness of 
a bankruptcy mechanism and draws parallels to the healthcare industry.249 
Debates about whether bankruptcy is a good option for a particular indus-
try or business arise in part because scholars often disagree about bankruptcy’s 
core purposes.250 Despite this debate, there are a few broad areas of general 
agreement. For example, scholars mostly agree that a bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion mechanism is appropriate when it enhances value for the parties.251 Many 
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scholars also believe that bankruptcy relief should be widely available.252 With 
respect to healthcare in particular, some argue that bankruptcy has value when 
it prevents the closure of healthcare facilities that are sustaining or prolonging 
patient lives.253 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the issue of whether to allow 
banks—and particularly any systemically important financial institution (SI-
FI)—to use bankruptcy has been an increasingly important topic of scholarly 
debate.254 Like healthcare businesses, banks are subject to significant regula-
tions. Notably, bank regulators make key decisions about how assets get dis-
tributed before an insolvency process even begins.255 Scholars such as Stephen 
Lubben have pointed out that bankruptcy’s distributional policy has little effect 
in the SIFI context.256 If, as many have contended, bankruptcy’s primary focus 
is about resolving competing creditors’ claims to limited assets,257 bank insol-
vency is focused instead on advancing legislative policy goals defined prior to 
insolvency.258 Put differently, because regulators make all of the significant 
decisions in a bank insolvency in advance of any court procedure getting start-
ed, there is at best a small role left for the bankruptcy judge to play in a SIFI 
insolvency and little point in going through the bankruptcy process.259 
This conclusion about banks and bankruptcy might at first glance also 
make sense in the healthcare context. As described in Part II, state and federal 
healthcare regulators often assert substantial authority over the debtor’s fi-
nances and operational capabilities.260 The decisions these regulators make 
when a healthcare institution experiences financial distress have an undeniable 
influence on the value of the debtor’s estate, creditor rank, and distribution of 
assets. In addition, a critical group of affected parties—depositors in the case 
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of banks and patients in the case of healthcare—may have difficulty coordinat-
ing and negotiating their interests in a bankruptcy case.261 
Healthcare debtors differ from banks, however, because most healthcare 
businesses have not been excluded from bankruptcy. Part II also demonstrated 
that bankruptcy courts can sometimes assert their authority and make decisions 
independently from healthcare regulators.262 For example, the court in In re 
Bayou Shores expressed that the healthcare facility in question could continue 
operating post-bankruptcy by signaling to regulators that the court was remov-
ing the core obstacle facing the facility’s continued operation—failure to as-
sume a Medicare provider agreement.263 Bankruptcy courts’ expertise in as-
sessing a business’s financial situation may permit a viable healthcare business 
to continue operating when a regulator may prefer to shut it down. Further-
more, unlike banks, healthcare businesses lack a robust set of non-bankruptcy 
rules and procedures that can accommodate them in the event they experience 
financial distress or insolvency. Finally, healthcare regulators, despite their 
tremendous influence over a bankruptcy case, do not have bank regulators’ 
ability to simply seize and sell an insolvent entity’s assets.264 
The recent scholarly debate about banks and the questions this Article 
raises about healthcare echo past debates regarding how to design appropriate 
bankruptcy relief for railroads. In the past, a receivership was a common 
method of resolving a railroad’s financial distress. Yet, these receiverships 
were largely ineffective at addressing a railroad’s financial problems.265 This is 
because a receivership would only work if the debtor and its creditors could 
agree on a plan, and distressed railroads were very much dependent on their 
creditors to make the process work.266 But railroads had no way of compelling 
creditor participation in a plan, and because the railroad’s creditors were in a 
comparatively stronger position, a railroad always ran the risk of failure if it 
attempted resolution of its debts through a receivership.267 Consequently, the 
debtor’s management had the incentive to propose a plan that provided for “the 
smallest possible abrogation” of creditor claims, with the typical result being 
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that the railroad’s financial structure was not substantially altered.268 The result 
of many receiverships was therefore “under-reorganization” of the railroad, 
meaning that financial difficulties were likely to arise again in the future.269 
For this reason, bankruptcy emerged as a competing solution to address rail-
roads’ financial distress. 
Like banks and the healthcare industry, railroads are heavily regulated. 
Among other federal agencies with jurisdiction over the railroads,270 the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration (FRA) promulgates and enforces rail safety regu-
lations,271 and the Surface Transportation Board (STB) has broad economic 
oversight of the railroads.272 State agencies also play a role in the regulation of 
railroads that cross their borders.273 The presence of these regulators indicates 
that, like in the healthcare context, operation of a railroad requires attention to 
public safety in addition to purely pecuniary interests. Thus, when a railroad 
experiences financial distress, it is critical to take both the interests of regula-
tors and the public into account. 
Congress sought to make bankruptcy responsive to these regulatory and 
public interests in part by creating a subchapter (Subchapter IV) of chapter 11 
that distinctly addresses railroad reorganizations.274 Through legislative action, 
Congress recognized that railroad bankruptcies, by virtue of these competing 
interests, raised different concerns than other business reorganizations and 
merited distinct treatment within the bankruptcy system. 
Many of Subchapter IV’s provisions seek to harmonize pecuniary and 
public safety interests. Notably, § 1163 of the Code provides for the STB to 
appoint a trustee to operate the railway in bankruptcy, with the aim of creating 
minimal disruption in rail services.275 Section 1164 provides that railroad regu-
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lators may appear and be heard on any issue in a case; however, these entities 
may not appeal from any judgment, order, or decree in the case, because the 
Code treats them as “intervening parties,” not “parties in interest.”276 In addi-
tion, § 1165 explicitly requires the court and the trustee in a railroad reorgani-
zation to “consider the public interest in addition to the interests of the debtor, 
creditors, and equity security holders.”277 The legislative history indicates that 
this provision exists because the public interest “is an important factor in rail-
road reorganization, which distinguishes [it] from other business reorganiza-
tions.”278 Finally, § 1166 provides an organizing principle of sorts for railroad 
reorganizations, explaining that, with certain exceptions, the trustee and the 
debtor are subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, and the trustee is subject to 
orders from regulators to the same extent as the debtor would be if not in bank-
ruptcy.279 Conversely, it also provides that any regulatory order that would re-
quire the expenditure “or the incurring of an obligation for the expenditure” of 
money from the estate will not be effective unless approved by the court.280 
Thus, § 1166 contemplates a principle where monetary-related regulatory or-
ders are subject to court approval. Other provisions of Subchapter IV explain 
how actions taken in a railroad reorganization interact with other laws, poli-
cies, and regulations pertaining specifically to railroads.281 
Like the financial distress of a SIFI or a railroad, the distress of a 
healthcare institution can have significant negative externalities and can trigger 
the involvement of multiple regulatory agencies. Much attention to date has 
been focused on finding an appropriate resolution mechanism for banks; how-
ever, the healthcare industry’s precarious financial state, the problems created 
by the ACA and its aftermath, and the industry’s sizeable impact on the U.S. 
economy as a whole indicate that it is at least as important to ensure that 
healthcare businesses have the tools they need to navigate financial distress go-
ing forward. Congress’s treatment of railroad reorganizations in bankruptcy 
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can provide a roadmap for how to address similar issues arising in the 
healthcare context. 
Regardless of how a healthcare business uses bankruptcy—to reorgan-
ize,282 to liquidate,283 or to engage in a structured asset sale284—the biggest 
differences between a healthcare provider bankruptcy and that of another type 
of business are the presence and involvement of patients and regulatory agen-
cies. These additional parties, who are significant players in the healthcare in-
dustry, complicate the case.285 
When healthcare providers seek bankruptcy relief, the conflicts between 
healthcare regulation and bankruptcy cannot be ignored. As previously dis-
cussed, healthcare regulators’ priorities and goals may impede bankruptcy’s 
ability to maximize returns to creditors.286 At the same time, the bankruptcy 
process, by requiring coordination of all parties, can provide a check on over-
zealous or financially-motivated regulatory concerns. Regulators, who com-
monly have their sights set on damage control, may be unable or unwilling to 
assess whether a liquidation is truly in the best interests of the provider, its pa-
tients, and its creditors compared to alternatives such as a restructuring.287 
Bankruptcy can provide breathing space, critical time for the parties (and a 
court) to assess the needs of the debtor, its patients, its creditors, and the com-
munity at large.288 Bankruptcy also provides a single forum in which the debt-
or can comprehensively address its creditors’ claims, in addition to federal 
preemption over conflicting state laws.289 
Recent research indicates that healthcare “debtors’ stated reasons for fil-
ing comport with why most businesses file chapter 11,” including “decreased 
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revenue, financial structure, and poor management.”290 Thus, healthcare debt-
ors often need bankruptcy for the same reasons many other businesses seek 
bankruptcy. Healthcare debtors also need bankruptcy because the Contracts 
Clause prohibits state actors from modifying contracts on a non-consensual 
basis.291 This hurdle can only be overcome through federal bankruptcy law. In 
part because provider agreements are typically characterized as such, executo-
ry contracts are a significant part of healthcare provider bankruptcies, making 
bankruptcy a necessary step for some healthcare providers seeking to sell or 
reject these agreements without being burdened with the full cost of any dam-
ages.292 In addition, an orderly reorganization process may be beneficial to 
protect the patients that are at risk whenever a healthcare institution experienc-
es severe financial distress.293 
Although bankruptcy presents particular challenges and conflicts in the 
healthcare setting, it may also be a necessary and valuable option for 
healthcare debtors faced with multiple creditors and the need for time to assess 
the path forward.294 It is true that the healthcare industry is subject to near con-
stant change; however, healthcare debtors have consistently shown a need for 
basic bankruptcy functions over the years. Although the current bankruptcy 
system fails to serve healthcare business debtors in many ways, if the bank-
ruptcy process can work in harmony with the broader regulatory and social 
healthcare environment, many of the problems healthcare debtors face in bank-
ruptcy would be significantly reduced. The next Subsection offers two pro-
posals to accomplish this goal. 
B. Proposals 
Healthcare is certainly not the only area where the Code has conflicted 
with other regulations or statutory schemes.295 Yet, due to the high stakes in a 
healthcare bankruptcy—the health of the nation’s population—there is a genu-
ine need to strike a careful balance among the interests of all parties affected 
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by a healthcare institution’s financial distress.296 Healthcare’s unique regulato-
ry and social environments create tensions that must be resolved with the poli-
cies and purposes underlying the Code whenever a healthcare provider files for 
bankruptcy. With this in mind, the following Subsections map out two possibil-
ities for reforming bankruptcy law to help the affected parties in a healthcare 
provider bankruptcy case assess the broader impacts of their decisions: (1) fur-
ther, discrete changes to the Code; and (2) creation of new Code subchapters 
specifically addressing the needs of distressed healthcare businesses, modeled 
in part off of Congress’s treatment of railroad reorganizations.297 
1. BAPCPA Round Two: More Specialization 
One fairly straightforward way to address fundamental conflicts between 
the Code and healthcare regulation is simply to make more amendments to the 
Code, similar to what Congress did with BAPCPA. There would be no struc-
tural change to the Code; instead, individual Code sections would be adjusted 
and new provisions added to further address healthcare debtors’ particular 
needs. Such changes, while significant, are likely to be less disruptive to cur-
rent bankruptcy practice than this Article’s alternative proposal. As a tactic re-
quiring relatively targeted changes, such an approach may also be more politi-
cally feasible than one that alters the Code’s overall structure.298 
The American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the Reform of 
Chapter 11 (the Commission) proposed exactly this type of change with re-
spect to the treatment of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under 
the Code. After years of study, the Commission concluded that the Code no 
longer works as intended for SMEs, primarily because current practice under 
the Code is too slow and costly for most SMEs to do much beyond sell their 
going concern assets or liquidate.299 
The Commission acknowledged that Congress had tried to address these 
concerns through BAPCPA but, much like BAPCPA’s effects in the healthcare 
context, the reforms made the process more “challenging and counterproduc-
tive” for SME debtors.300 Like healthcare debtors, SMEs were turning to alter-
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natives to bankruptcy, such as receiverships, to address their fiscal distress.301 
But the Commission observed that receiverships and other remedies presented 
their own sets of problems, such as inconsistency and lack of transparency.302 
To address its concerns, the Commission proposed numerous concrete re-
forms to the Code.303 These reforms required modification to existing Code 
provisions and included changes such as no oversight by an unsecured credi-
tors committee, the appointment of an estate neutral to oversee the case, and 
specific amendments to address problems with plan timing, content, and con-
firmation.304 In all, the Commission sought to strike an appropriate balance 
between the need to assess an SME debtor’s viability early in a case while still 
allowing viable SME cases the opportunity to succeed.305 In large part, the 
Commission’s proposed changes were designed to simplify the bankruptcy 
process for SME debtors by “reducing costs and barriers” and “providing tools 
to facilitate effective reorganizations for viable companies.”306 The Commis-
sion correctly recognized that chapter 11’s current, “one-size-fits-all” approach 
was not working for all debtors.307 Thus, the Commission sought to address 
cost and complexity concerns for SMEs while acknowledging that the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s overarching framework was appropriate for most SME debtors. 
Modifying the Code to create additional specialized provisions addressing 
the needs of healthcare debtors, similar to the Commission’s approach for 
SMEs, may well be an attractive option. Healthcare debtors face similar chal-
lenges to those that were facing SMEs: BAPCPA has made the process more 
complicated for both debtor types, and both healthcare providers and SMEs 
have sought out alternatives to bankruptcy. Changes to the Code to address 
situations uniquely found in healthcare could resolve the issues with respect to 
eligibility, treatment of provider agreements and excise taxes, valuation, juris-
diction, the reach of the automatic stay, and the question of classifying collec-
tion of overpayments described above. Most of these issues simply require 
clarification in the healthcare context. For example, Congress could delineate 
the scope of healthcare entities eligible for bankruptcy and definitively decide 
whether provider agreements constitute executory contracts. Congress could 
also clarify the extent to which bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over Medi-
care- and Medicaid-related disputes that have not run their course in the ad-
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ministrative context. These changes would require discrete statutory fixes, 
such as clarifications or additions to existing statutory language. 
The benefits of additional specialization within the existing statutory 
framework lie primarily in clarity and consistency. Even if Congress decides to 
enact reforms that make it more difficult for healthcare businesses to use the 
bankruptcy system (by, for example, saying that providers must exhaust their 
administrative remedies prior to raising issues in bankruptcy court), healthcare 
businesses and the entities that interact with them would know what to expect 
when engaging in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, simply clarifying the Code 
by adding more provisions specific to the healthcare context could go a long 
way toward making the bankruptcy process more predictable for healthcare 
business debtors. 
Unlike with SMEs, however, healthcare debtors must grapple with the 
presence of regulators and the impacts of their financial distress on patients. 
Simply adjusting existing Code provisions, without more, may not go far 
enough in addressing the balance of power between the bankruptcy judge and 
regulators responsible for ensuring adequate healthcare to citizens. In addition, 
as experience with BAPCPA demonstrates, further reforms to discrete sections 
of the Code risk muddying the waters, in part because Congress may not be 
considering these reforms’ overall impact on the healthcare industry. 
Clarifying amendments to the Code, however comprehensive, would also 
likely not address a key problem Part II identified: the Code’s lack of an organ-
izing principle that applies uniquely to healthcare debtors. Bankruptcy’s value, 
in part, can be attributed to its ability to eliminate collective action problems 
and provide a cohesive priority scheme for all parties involved in a case. But 
the lack of a scheme that incorporates healthcare regulators and patient inter-
ests means that courts have little guidance as to how to balance these compet-
ing concerns. For this reason, it may be necessary to consider further adjust-
ments to the structure of the Code. 
2. Healthcare Business Bankruptcy Subchapters 
Congress could more comprehensively help judges assess the challenges of 
healthcare provider bankruptcies by amending the Code to create two new sub-
chapters addressing the liquidation and reorganization of healthcare debtors. 
These subchapters would be housed within two of the existing chapters available 
to healthcare debtors: chapter 7 (liquidation) and chapter 11 (reorganization).308 
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Creating specific healthcare subchapters would allow Congress to address 
both of the primary problems Part II identified with respect to healthcare pro-
vider bankruptcies. Using the subchapters, Congress could make specific clari-
fications with respect to healthcare debtors without concern that these clarifi-
cations would have broader impacts across the Code as a whole. The subchap-
ter design would also allow Congress to articulate a specific organizing princi-
ple applicable uniquely in the healthcare context, similar to what it did in the 
railroad reorganization subchapter. Finally, because the early engagement of 
regulators is often crucial to a successful healthcare provider bankruptcy, Con-
gress could use the healthcare subchapters to define and clarify regulators’ 
roles and perhaps facilitate early coordination with regulators. 
Undoubtedly, creating new subchapters within the Code for healthcare 
debtors would be viewed as a radical reform, but such reform is justified for 
three primary reasons. First, as discussed, healthcare provider bankruptcies are 
simply different from the bankruptcies of other businesses. The requirements 
of regulatory agencies and patients add a distinct dimension to healthcare 
bankruptcy cases. In these cases, the judge must balance these demands with 
the interests of creditors and with bankruptcy’s goal of value maximization. 
Second, the healthcare industry is a significant component of the U.S. econo-
my. Because healthcare financial distress can result in considerable negative 
repercussions for the economy as a whole, healthcare provider bankruptcies 
deserve particular attention. Finally, the healthcare regulatory environment is 
constantly changing, making the need to create an organizing principle in 
bankruptcy both urgent and compelling. Providing separate subchapters for 
healthcare provider bankruptcies will allow future adjustments to these sub-
chapters to be made directly in response to industry changes in a way that will 
not impact the process for other debtors.309 In short, creating these subchapters, 
while perhaps a more onerous task than more discrete reform efforts, allows 
the Code to better address the distinct needs of an important and significant 
industry. 
Although the exact content of the healthcare provider bankruptcy sub-
chapters would be subject to debate and approval by Congress, and ideally af-
ter significant consultation with professional organizations and industry lead-
ers, the following features should be considered for inclusion. First, a center-
piece of the subchapters should be an organizing principle to help bankruptcy 
courts balance regulatory and patient concerns with the financial interests of 
the debtor and its creditors. To craft this organizing principle, Congress should 
recognize the bankruptcy court’s expertise in dealing with financial issues by 
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giving deference to the court with respect to decisions involving these issues. 
On the other hand, courts should defer to regulators and their expertise in ad-
dressing public health and safety issues when questions of that nature arise. 
When issues involving a mix of financial and public health interests arise, the 
court should determine which interests predominate and proceed accordingly.310 
By allowing deference to regulatory concerns in some, but not all situa-
tions, Congress could balance regulators’ need to protect the public health with 
the bankruptcy goals of a healthcare institution and its creditors. The goal is to 
create meaningful opportunities for regulators to work within the bankruptcy 
process and to set clearer expectations on the extent and scope of regulator 
involvement in healthcare provider bankruptcies. 
When assessing the power of regulators with respect to the bankruptcy 
court, Congress should keep in mind established principles that apply else-
where in the bankruptcy context to delineate when a government interest 
should override bankruptcy policy. For example, government requests for ex-
ceptions to the automatic stay are granted or denied based on whether the gov-
ernment entity in question is acting for a primarily pecuniary or public pur-
pose.311 If a court finds that the government entity is seeking an exception to 
the automatic stay to pursue a predominantly pecuniary purpose (for example, 
the collection of money), the court will not grant the exception. Congress ap-
plied this same general principle when it created the railroad reorganization 
subchapter, providing for court approval when regulators’ decisions resulted in 
the expenditure of estate funds.312 Similarly, regulatory actions should be as-
sessed by the bankruptcy court for their underlying purpose. If the purpose is 
primarily pecuniary in nature, such action or proposed action should receive 
less deference in the bankruptcy process than if the regulator’s interest is moti-
vated primarily by public health and safety concerns. 
The subchapters should also include an explicit, participatory mechanism 
for regulators and the PCO, modeled off of the subchapter for railroads, where 
regulators are considered “intervening parties” rather than “parties in inter-
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est.”313 A similar provision also appears in § 1109 of the Code, which provides 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may appear in a case and 
raise and be heard on any issue.314 Although the SEC may not appeal from a 
judgment, order, or decree in a case, it may still participate in any appeal by 
any other party in interest. Like railroad regulators and the SEC, healthcare 
regulators and PCOs could also be classified as “intervening parties,” which 
may better define their role and limitations in a bankruptcy case. 
Finally, using the subchapters, Congress could provide clarification on 
many of the issues that are currently unsettled in healthcare provider bankrupt-
cies, such as debtor eligibility, the treatment of provider agreements and quali-
ty assurance fees, bankruptcy court jurisdiction, and the proper characteriza-
tion of government recovery of overpayments. A benefit of using subchapters 
to make these clarifications is that Congress can implement them without con-
cern that they will have larger ripple effects across the Code.315 Particularly 
because the healthcare industry is prone to rapid change, addressing these 
changes through subchapters mitigates the need for Congress to take a look at 
the Code as a whole whenever changes to the healthcare provider bankruptcy 
process are desired. 
The creation of subchapters for healthcare business bankruptcies would 
signal Congress’s recognition of something practitioners have been saying for 
decades: healthcare business bankruptcies are simply different. Specifically, 
the heavily regulated structure of a healthcare business and the business’s core 
functions raise different concerns in bankruptcy compared with other business 
debtors.316 Through the creation of subchapters, Congress can recognize both 
the significance and the distinctiveness of healthcare business bankruptcies 
while creating tailored policies and procedures that do not impact the rest of 
the Code. 
Scholars and policymakers alike have favored the subchapter concept as a 
means to incorporate significant changes that better serve particular debtors in 
the Code. For example, Professor Bruce Markell has advocated for the creation 
of a separate subchapter for individual chapter 11 debtors.317 Separate subchap-
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ters already exist in the Code for railroad reorganizations318 and stockbroker 
liquidations.319 And recently, Congress passed a law creating a new subchapter 
for SMEs,320 recognizing the “unique needs of small businesses” that include 
the need to reduce unnecessary procedures and the need for a quick reorganiza-
tion process.321 
Creation of subchapters within the Code thus signals congressional intent 
that certain classes of debtors deserve distinct forms of treatment.322 Given the 
significant changes required to address the competing needs of parties in a 
healthcare provider bankruptcy case, specific subchapters would signal recog-
nition that the administration of a healthcare debtor’s bankruptcy case signifi-
cantly and substantially differs from that of other bankruptcy cases.323 
New subchapters within the Code would provide the opportunity for cab-
ined, substantive changes to the Code. Because new Code subchapters can ex-
plicitly and directly address concerns with respect to regulators and patients, 
this proposed change can more thoroughly address the problems currently as-
sociated with healthcare provider bankruptcies than further piecemeal changes. 
Subchapters give healthcare debtors the attention they deserve and consolidate 
their presence within the Code, which may result in more uniform and more 
predictable treatment for these debtors in the long run. New subchapters allow 
bankruptcy law to accommodate differences in healthcare law without a need 
to rethink the bankruptcy process for other debtors that may not need such ac-
commodation. Finally, new subchapters can better situate regulators and pa-
tient representatives within a healthcare provider’s bankruptcy case, thus serv-
ing bankruptcy’s broader goals of being responsive to the needs of all parties in 
interest. 
Like any major revision to the Code, this proposal has the potential to im-
pose significant costs as well as major benefits. This proposal may well make 
the Code more complicated, as existing healthcare provisions are removed and 
concentrated in entirely new subchapters. Like any new process, bankruptcies 
under the new subchapters will likely be costly at first, and there is likely to be 
substantial, short-term uncertainty as to how cases will be resolved. 
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Nevertheless, the experience of healthcare debtors post-BAPCPA illus-
trates that reliance on more incremental changes may be misplaced. BAPCPA’s 
healthcare bankruptcy reforms have failed to clear up fundamental inconsist-
encies in the way that regulators, patients, and creditors interact in a healthcare 
provider’s bankruptcy case. In response to these reforms, many healthcare 
debtors have sought to resolve their financial distress through alternatives to 
bankruptcy, which often do not provide adequate debtor protections. Instead of 
slowly freezing healthcare debtors out of bankruptcy, it is worth considering 
whether a more holistic revision to the bankruptcy framework is necessary or 
appropriate. 
BAPCPA failed to address many of the key problems with healthcare pro-
vider bankruptcies because it failed to recognize explicitly that healthcare 
debtors should receive distinctly different treatment in bankruptcy than other 
debtors. By scattering reforms across the Code, BAPCPA also failed to articu-
late a much-needed organizing principle for healthcare provider bankruptcies. 
In contrast, healthcare-specific subchapters would link creation of an organiz-
ing principle to structural reform within the Code targeted specifically at 
healthcare debtors. 
CONCLUSION 
The healthcare industry is on the edge of a severe financial crisis.324 For 
many healthcare debtors, bankruptcy has proven a mediocre option at best. 
Meanwhile, alternatives to bankruptcy do not often provide sufficient debtor 
protections, lack an organizing principle, and may be difficult to expand. 
Bankruptcy law could do more to recognize this impending crisis and to fortify 
the mechanisms available to address it. 
This Article suggests that changes to the structure of the bankruptcy sys-
tem are highly desirable in order to help financially distressed healthcare insti-
tutions to “fail better.” In particular, the balance of power between the bank-
ruptcy court and healthcare regulators needs to be clarified so that bankruptcy 
can work in harmony with regulatory goals. To accomplish this end, Congress 
should consider substantial reforms to the Code, and, in particular, should con-
sider the creation of subchapters specific to healthcare debtors, providing them 
with much-needed specialized attention. Although the addition of new sub-
chapters risks making the Code more cumbersome and complex, such com-
plexity is warranted given the differences between healthcare institutions and 
other debtors, the extensive healthcare regulatory backdrop, and the number of 
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individuals with competing interests present in a healthcare provider bankrupt-
cy case. 
On a broader level, the Code is over forty years old. As the Code has been 
put to the test over the years, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers have 
recognized that there are many instances where the Code fails to work as in-
tended.325 This Article has brought attention to one previously underappreciat-
ed area where the Code is not serving debtors effectively. As scholars and 
lawmakers continue to assess the Code, it is worth considering whether the 
subchapter concept has broader applications to other bankruptcy misfits.  
If bankruptcy law and procedure are to serve valuable purposes, the bank-
ruptcy process may well have to change to adapt to the times. Healthcare pro-
vider bankruptcies represent one portion of bankruptcies that no longer mirror 
the process the Code’s drafters envisioned in 1978. As discussed, scholars and 
policymakers are already considering revisions to the Code to address resolu-
tions for distressed financial institutions,326 and Congress recently created a 
subchapter for SMEs. But other entities, including bitcoin exchanges,327 tribal 
businesses,328 and nonprofits329 may also face difficulty when using the Code. 
This Article therefore suggests that a restructuring of the Code may be needed 
to ensure that these and other bankruptcy misfits can be accommodated. 
Creating new subchapters for healthcare debtors provides an opportunity 
to assess when and whether further specialization within the Code makes 
sense. The tradeoffs of increased specialization compared to increased com-
plexity should be considered for many other types of debtors. Healthcare pro-
vider bankruptcy reform may represent just a first step in the eventual remak-
ing of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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